Saturday, November 14, 2020

A proposal for an Iranian ICBM

Prelude

In early November 2020, two event coincided: The results of a historic U.S election became known and the anniversary of the Bidgane accident that killed the "father of Irans missile program" Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam.

These two events led to three disclosures: Deputy general of the Revolutionary Guard aerospace forces Mousavi in his first publiced speech, announced that beside short-, mid- and long-range missile capabilities, his force also has advanced Irans intercontinental capabilities.

This claim was a first for Iran and was later censored, to create plausible deniability. Iran had previously voluntarily restricted itself to a 2000km range limit.

The second disclosure was the unveiling of a new launch//basing method for Iran's so called underground "missile cities". The message was that of Iran's possession of a nuclear blast hardened, second strike missile capability. See my blogpost about it: https://patarames.blogspot.com/2020/11/irans-path-to-second-strike-capability.html

The third disclosure is significant for OSINT missile performance analysis: The payload capability of the Qased SLV, launched in April 2020. U.S intelligence certainly knew about this parameter, but for OSINT it is the enabler to calculate the performance of the Salman second stage motor.


Significance of Salman

Qased SLV with Salman second stage compared to a Ghadr BM


Salman is a very compact size stage, that could be a ideal add-on package for the existing IRGC-ASF missile arsenal, but only if it performs high enough, that such a retrofit effort makes sense.

The Salman upper stage motor has following features:

  • Solid fuel
  • Lightweight all-carbon-filament woven composite casing
  • Flexnozzle, gimballed composite nozzle with electro-mechanical TVC actuators

As no performance parameters were disclosed on it, indirect ways were required to calculate these.

To calculate it, following parameters need to be known or confidently approximated:

  • Burnout speed (known from the boost phase graph in the video)
  • Propellant/motor/nozzle combination Isp (approximated with published Fateh-110 data)
  • Payload (approximated via official payload data, approximated mass of third stage, guidance package, cold-gas bus system and estimated mass of shroud/fairing)
  • Aerodynamic losses (estimated from similar aceleration, tip/stepping geometry and length/diameter ratio missiles/SLV)
  • Fueled mass (known via geometry/dimension data from Qased SV launch)
  • Empty mass (major unknown)
The available data and reasonable approximations allowed to calculate the performance of the Salman upper stage: When used with the Qased SLV, it is the amount of additional speed, delta-v it can generate while hauling the mass that sits on top of it; the total impulse.
The lower the weight of the motor that delivers this total impulse, the higher its performance.

Key here is the structural ratio of the Salman, which is the empty mass divided by the fueled mass. Its performance within the three stages of the Qased SLV allows to determine the structural ratio necessary to deliver that kind of performance.

Intentionally leaked delta-v/time graph of Qased launch

The Qased's first stage, a Ghadr-F ballistic missile, is well known and its performance can be modeled via its range-payload ratio. This gives an idea on what it has to haul, what sits on it, via its published burnout velocity. 
The Salman above it lacks range-payload ratio, but its burnout velocity is known and what mass it hauls can be estimated well. 
How? Via the sum of delta-v the first two stages generate, plus the third stage must have a performance that allows the 20kg Noor satellite to be delivered to a 430km low earth orbit. So the third stage and its necessary delta-v can be modeled to tell what needs to be known: What, or how much is the Salman second stage hauling?
Finally via this mass parameter an estimate for the empty mass and the structural ratio of the Salman stage can be made.
The answer is between 0,012 and 0,016, or 12%-16% of the total Salman mass is that of the motor itself and the rest is fuel. A more precise estimation would require knowledge about the exact weight of the shroud/fairing and the avionic package.

For details on the calculations, read this blogpost: https://patarames.blogspot.com/2020/06/trident-ii-and-df-31-comparing-data.html

With the performance of the Salman upper stage approximated, one question arises:


The options for upgrade

MaRV equipped Khorramshahr-2 at ascend


In terms of size, the Salman is very compact and could be even stored in a secure warhead storage container, together with the warhead. In operational conditions, hence fitting a existing missile with a Salman and its warhead should be feasible. If launcher interface and structural reserve margins allow for it.

  • The Qased SLV uses Ghadr MRBM first stage, which is sufficiently robust designed to take the additional weight. This combination creates a lightweight SLV or ASAT weapon. Used as a ballistic missile with Salman as second stage and legacy guidance system removed, it would have a range of ~5.200km with a reduced weight warhead of 400kg.


  • The Sejil solid fuel MRBM is another candidate for the Salman, here in the role of the third stage of an all-solid fuel ballistic missile. This system would have the tactical advantage of being able to launch on short notice and being independently road-mobile. The range with Salman as third stage and legacy guidance system removed would be ~7.200km with a reduced weight 400kg warhead.

  • Here the topic of this article becomes relevant. The Khorramshahr MRBM is a trivial choice as the highest performance ballistic missile in Irans arsenal. It is a variant of the Soviet R-27 SLBM, which was far ahead of its time and the technological marvel of the Makeyev OKB. The latest variant, the Khorramshar-2, with its guidance system removed would have a range of ~10.100km with a reduced weight warhead of 400kg.
The last range value of 10.100km is equivalent to the distance of Tehran to Washington D.C, Iran's major adversary.
So while a Ghadr upgraded with a Salman upper stage and reduced warhead assembly becomes a (long range) IRBM and a Sejil-2 equipped accordingly a (short range) ICBM, the Khorramshahr becomes a true ICBM.
The key enabler beside the compact Salman upper stage, are the new generation fiberoptic inertial navigation system that drastically saves weight on the guidance and avionics package.

Khorramshahr-Salman ICBM

Up to scale details of the layout

The economic attractiveness and the reasoning of a conventional ICBM were questioned in the past and already the R-27 and its more potent Khorramshahr variant are highly complex, costly systems.

As a single stage ballistic missile, the Khorramshahr has a complicated staged combustion motor that is immersed inside the fuel tank. It has common bulkheads and divided tanks for center of gravity management. The tanks of the R-27 are made of an aluminum-magnesium alloy that is chemically milled. The Khorrmshahr may achieve similar structural strength and rigidity by using flow formed tanks, having higher structural requirements due to larger size and payload. Additional complexity is due to pressurizing gas from the motor being injected back to the oxidizer tanks to avoid cavitation.

R-27's 4D10 Staged combustion engine: SpaceX is yet to
move to this advanced cycle with its Raptor engine

This all illustrates how far beyond R-17 Scud-B level technology the Khorramshahr is and how difficult it was to master it and make it a mature missile system.

This effort made sense for the IRGC-ASF because the payload capacity of the Khorramshahr was almost three times higher than the Ghadr-F. So replacing three Ghadr-F with a single Khorramshahr was worth the effort. 

While Khorramshahr represents a more economic solution than the Ghadr, mastering it took some time for Iran. DPRK's R-27 variant, the HS-10 and the two HS-13 ICBM variants based on it, became failed projects and the North Koreans simply gave up on it after a series of failed flight tests.

Size comparison of Iran's Khorramshahr, DPRK HS-10, and original R-27.
The Iranian and Korean variants are very different to each other in detail.

Iran however pursued this technological path as its range requirements were lower than that of the DPRK and the compactness of the design made it more useful in terms of launch survivability/basing.

Was the option for a Khorrmashahr-Salman ICBM an unintended path, or did one technological breakthrough, in form of the Khorramshahr, await another breakthrough in form of the Salman to enable a light ICBM?

In terms of system cost a Khorrmashahr-Salman conventional light ICBM can be quite attractive. Just two stages with two motors, with the large first stage being storable for long periods of time, having an excellent life-cycle-cost relationship.

However would a light weight conventional 400kg re-entry vehicle warhead make economic and military sense? 

At this point it should be noted that Iran's Fateh-110/-313 SRBM, which was used against Kurdish separatists and the U.S base at Ain-al-Assad Iraq, used light weight 448kg warheads, but with 10m CEP precision.

At the velocities of intercontinental range re-entry, trajectory corrections with a MaRV become immensely more difficult. Without MaRV for trajectory corrections, a CEP of 100-300m would be possible in the best case scenario. The value would likely be closer to 300m CEP and above, since only highly evolved RV designs are able to reach numbers near 100m, via their high speed sharp nose-tip and body designs.

300-500m CEP with a 400kg warhead would still be a valuable asset against the opponents high value targets of large dimensions. True military capability that comes close to a counter-force capability however would not be achievable.

Such a light weight warhead would make use of the highest grade explosives to compensate the gap to a standard Iranian 650kg unitary warhead. However the key to overcome this shortcoming is only increased precision. 

An option could be an light weight aerodynamic steering module, that corrects re-entry trajectory in the uppermost atmospheric layers and detaches once velocity and angular errors are corrected. This would allow more blunt, initial generation, intercontinental range RVs to close into the 100m CEP region.

In conclusion such a light weight, unitary, 400kg warhead, would need to compensate the lack of mass via improved explosive power and higher precision. Alternatives could be using submunition or thermobaric warheads. The latter solutions are easier and more feasible but are restricted to area targets and are less destructive against targets which are hardened.

The most likely candidate would be a submunition warhead and with an estimated CEP of above 500m. A counter-value asset of intercontinental range.


Conclusion

Salman: The technological enabler

If the Salman upper stage could be fitted like a different warhead to the existing Iranian ballistic missile arsenal to enable a whole new set of range capabilities, it could be described the ultimate force-multiplier. A smart, modular capability, preserving previous investments in the missile arsenal and made possible by key technological breakthroughs.

Logistics and handling, would not get significantly more complicated since Salman with warhead could be handled as a 2,2 ton heavy warhead, not compromising explosive security procedures of Irans "missile cities". At just 14-14,5m length the Khorramshahr-Salman ICBM would fit well into the unveiled missile tunnels and wagon. With a weight of 20 ton, its light enough for the R-27 4D10 motor to acclerate and the existing Khorramshahr TEL to transport.

Also in terms of costs, it would make much sense to reduce payload in order to reach intercontinental range.

True military relevance however, would require precision strike capability like e.g Irans Fateh family. In more distant future, the range-payload relation could be significantly improved by a hypersonic glide vehicle, the growth potential here is given.

The unveiling of the Qased SLV, an legacy Ghadr-F with Salman fitted to it, was a message of a new capability, one that can be applied to the existing arsenal. The impact this compact 2,2m length, 1m diameter upper stage has on the range capability of the existing arsenal, is immense.

At times of increased tensions, the unveiling of nuclear blast hardened, underground missile complexes equipped with a large number of light intercontinental missiles, has a heavy effect on the decision making table. It is a latent intercontinental range capability whether to turn existing MRBMs to ICBMs, threatening U.S mainland, or not.

Once a dream: A young Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam in front
 of a Chinese missile, when Iran has no missile program yet

It's a late gift from Hassan Tehrani Moghaddam; mastering the key technologies of the Salman upper stage was what lead to his death.

Sunday, November 8, 2020

Iran's path to a second strike capability


The concept
Interpretation of Irans new basing concept

Non-nuclear states can have the highest conventional military capability but are always regarded as irrelevant, once the joker function of nuclear warfare is employed.

This intuitive notion is based on two main ideas:

  • There is no credible defense against nuclear weapons
  • Conventional weapons are unable to establish significant counter-value and counter-force deterance
Irans missile warfare doctrine of the 21st century relies on three main capabilities:
  • Ballistic missiles that are sufficiently accurate to perform point-strikes (~50m CEP) on the opponents key objects. These can be counter-value targets such as powerplants and other critical infrastructure or counter-value targets like missile silos or BMD early warning radars.
  • Ballistic missile launch and basing options that can survive an opponents nuclear counter-force decapitation strike and carry out the mission to inflict heavy damage on the opponent
  • The inflicted damage on the enemy is done in a sufficiently high pace to deny any counter-campaign aimed to neutralize Irans missile forces to bear fruits. Once that capability can be disabled, it has already spent its ballistic missile arsenal and has no further function in the conflict.
Once such a capability is reached, the nuclear option of the opponent is neutralized due to two realities:
  • A nuclear counter-force strike will not disable Irans counter-strike capability and what survives is sufficient to cause a scale of damage that can't be tolerated by the opponent
  • The scale of damage due to point-strike capability on critical and high value targets, reaches a level high enough, to be compared to what was previously only possible with nuclear weapons or at least complete air dominance.

Survivable basing


In August 2020 Iran revealed a novel soft basing method for solid fuel ballistic missiles; buried missile containers. This concept is based on ambiguity of true and decoy sites, as well as large areal distances such so called "missile farms" can have. 
For a nuclear counter-force strike to neutralize these low hardened assets, large areas need to be hit, increasing the number of nuclear weapons needed.
Other solid fuel ballistic missiles in Irans arsenal are either: 
  • Road-mobile, single autonomous vehicles, which can launch the missile quickly after receiving the order (e.g Sejil). 
  • Or off-road capable transporter erector launchers that can hide in the terrain ( e.g Dezful).
Irans mountainous terrain is especially well suited for the latter of the two launch methods. Deep valleys deny line of sight for stand-off reconnaissance assets which requires it, as well as blast deflection of conventional and nuclear weapons.
Another mean Iran employs for increasing the survivability of its TELs is to design them small enough to disguise them as civilian trucks, e.g by using a plastic cover.

Dezful solid-fuel BM off-road twin-missile launch TEL


For liquid fueled missiles, the situation is more complicated.
Iran prefers to keep its liquids fuel ballistic missiles and even expand on it, despite the availability of solid fuel missiles for three main reasons:
  • The higher performance/ISP of liquid fuel ballistic missiles allows heavier payloads and longer ranges at same size.
  • They can be safely stored without any risk of explosion, or catastrophic cascade event, making them attractive for deep tunnel basing. That's primarily due to the physically separate location of fuel and oxidizer tanks as well as warheads
  • If stored in unfueled, dry condition, their lifetime without significant refurbishment is immense. The investment in the arsenal is hence a multi-generation one and life-cycle costs makes such conventional liquid fuel ballistic missiles attractive.
The problems liquid fueled missile cause are however also significant:
  • A well and continously trained crew is needed for fueling and handling the missile
  • Irans new generation missiles have fuel/oxidizer combinations which can't be used at high temperatures, typical in Iran
So while a solid fueled Sejil-2 TEL can travel hundreds of kilometres, disguised as civilian truck and hide anywhere, liquid fuel TELs can't operate very far from their home base.


Missile cities

The concept of storing the valuable ballistic missile arsenal in deep tunnel complexes is not new and China, North Korea and Iran are the countries that employ this basing concept most prominently. Iran calls this kinds a complexes "missile cities" due to their large scale.

These bases are often so deeply buried into mountains, that the arsenal is secure against nuclear weapon strikes. However nuclear strikes at the entrances of such bases can potentially disable them for the rest of a high intensity conflict or reduce their significance as they are not able to operate until they are fixed.

Missiles and TELs stored in a typical missile city tunnel

In conventional attacks against such missile tunnel complexes, excavator machines and other constructing machines will either re-open the entrance in a short period of time or create alternative emergency exits if necessary.
The entrance sections also employ high-grade tunnel lining with high-performance composite concrete.
Damage caused by conventional bunker busters against such entrance structures are lower than often intuitively anticipated. This is true for bunker busters that can be delivered by survivable airpower, as well as bomber delivered special assets like the GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator.
So whereas dozens of meters of soft rock can be penetrated by such weapons or several roofs made of normal-grade concrete, the values dramatically diminishes to a few meters or lower against hard granite rock formations or high-performance composite concrete.

The effects on critical assets inside tunnel complexes via such conventional weapons is almost non-existent due to the rock formation overburden of typically 50-100m for the least hardened of these.
Hence a credible capability for fast repair and continued operation is guaranteed against conventional bunker busters.

At this point its necessary to stress the time-critical nature of operation of such missile tunnel complexes. With their sole goal being the launch of the complete stored ballistic missile arsenal and heavy conventional bunker busters having airpower as their only delivery platform a dilemma is created: In order to deliver the bunker buster, the opponents integrated air defense system and its assets must be degraded sufficiently to allow the chance of successful delivery of the weapon.
  • The range of Irans ballistic missiles allow missile cities to be based deep in the central areas of Iran, which is a vast country.
  • The distance airpower must survive, flying through hostile airspace, without a mission-kill or total loss, is hundreds of kilometres. Evasive maneuvering with such heavy payloads often equates to mission-kill.
  • The time criticality of ballistic missile warfare does not allow for a significant SEAD/DEAD campaign to disable the opponents IADS
  • Irans IADS and its assets have reached a technological level that enables effecitvley countering low observability techniques primarily employed by western airpower against high value targets. 
  • Irans task would be the protection of a point target (missile city), which is magnitudes easier to defend than random area targets. Subsonic cruise missile delivered warheads would be most severely affected in such a point-defense engagement secenaro.

Countering missile cities

A solution to the threat presented by such missile city basing today would be nuclear warheads delivered by accurate ballistic missiles. Future options could be hypersonic conventional "bunker busting" missiles or low-yield earth penetrating warheads delivered by ballistic missiles.

Granite rock formations can withstand contact fuse 300 kiloton yield thermonuclear ballistic missile re-entry vehicle delivered warheads (~100m CEP) if the depth/overburden is around:
  • 300m if low-end rockbolt and mesh tunnel lining is employed. This is typical for very deep missile storage areas and low-risk transit tunnel sections which can tolerate damage.
  • 100m if high end backpacked concrete lining is employed. This is typical for critical forward sections with sensitive equipment and personel.
  • 30-50m if high-performance-concrete structures for entrance areas are present. Such transit sections can tolerate damage and spall/rubble and just need to remain passable.
Rockbolt and mesh liner type: Handling area
with polymer spall protection, transit area without


Entrance areas which nearly always have less granite overburden than those mentioned 30-50m, suffer great damage due to risk of complete tunnel collapse. To break free and clear such entrance sections for continued launch operations, a significant amount time is necessary. Multiple hits over time can permanentley disable the missile city for the duration of the war.
So while the missile arsenal can't be eliminated by the opponents nuclear weapon systems, a mission-kill for the conflict is possible against these kind of missile tunnel complexes.


Nuclear hardened missile cities

Missile cities that can withstand nuclear strikes and continue launch operations are of the cavern shaft type.
This concept does not need an entrance area or a opening large enough for a TEL to operate and instead launches missiles from inside of the mountain via a vertical shaft that can be dozens of meters in length.
As long as the shaft remains clear, launch operations can continue and the nature of this concept allows it to take several strikes of accurate (e.g. Trident II re-entry vehicles) counter-force-rated nuclear weapons and remain operational.

Cavern shaft launch of a Qiam SRBM


Since Irans lacks a nuclear triad and expensive delivery platforms such as SSBN's, it can concentrate its resources on developing such a complex and expensive basing method as cavern shaft basing.
During the trails for a basing method for the U.S MX Peacekeeper ICBM, cavern basing was assessed to be the most survivable basing concept in terms of hardness but also one of the most expensive ones.
Only Iran is known to employ the cavern shaft launch concept and potentially North Korea.
The rock overburden of such Iranian complexes are however probably not suitable for multiple nuclear weapon hits due to the relative low shaft depth.
Displayed examples of such complexes, show that they shot one missile at a time which works in counter to the time parameter that is of greatest important in high intensity missile warfare.

Early November 2020 Iran presented a novel ballistic missile launch and loading concept. A hardened-mobility electrical rail wagon, that carries 5 ready to launch liquid fuel missiles, which are loaded in a semi-automated erector system. It can be best described as a multiple-launch carousel-magazine loading and launch system which allows continuous parallel loading operations.

IRGC aerospace forces did not show how and where the missiles are launched.
The highest end launch method would be the combination with the previously unveiled cavern shaft launch concept, potentially with a vertical shaft with more than 100m depth.

However, it seems that Iran has selected a lower-end, much less complicated and resource-intensive concept that maintains nuclear hardness requirements.
The concept is based on following features:
  • An open-air pit, just deep enough not to be exposed to high blast over-pressure and thermal heat levels.
  • Small enough for very low risk of a direct nuclear RV hit into the pit.
  • Deep enough to require weapon trajectories with steep angle of attack, in order to hit the critical lower part of the pit, where the rails and tunnel door are located.
  • Location deep inside a valley to complicate weapon trajectories and make use of natural barriers for blast deflection


Detailed graphic showing how the new concept probably functions


The launch pit is drilled into hard granite rock and re-enforced and lined with high-performance concrete structures. Such relative small structures can be heavily protected against nuclear weapons, just like ICBM silos are designed to remain intact with a nearby hit of a thermonuclear warhead (~300m).
In contrast to a ICBM silo, the launch pit neither houses sensitive equipment nor has any other function than to house the door and the rails. Hence its tolerance to damage is not only higher but it can also be repaired with crude means if necessary.
The goal of the launch pit is to keep nuclear blast caused erosion low enough to allow the door and rails to remain intact. Ground shock levels, the primary defeat mechanism of nuclear weapons against hardened targets, need to remain low enough for the last 10-30m of the missile transit tunnel not to collapse irreparably. Vibration levels and suspension requirements in this tunnel section can be neglected as just collapse and door malfunction must be avoided.

Multi megaton yield nuclear warheads have more adverse effects but are not used for counter-force strikes, mainly since there are either fewer or heavier. Earth penetrating nuclear bunker busters are mainly restricted to airpower delivery as ballistic missile RV impact causes very high deceleration forces.

The newly unveiled complex

Loading chamber of new launch concept, note scale


Beside this new basing and launch concept the tunnel complex also has TELs as secondary launch option. The vast complex has deep missile storage sections with rockbolt and mesh lining, sections with polymer spall liners where sensitive equipment is handled and ground shock effects are likely to cause low damage. Warhead mating and TEL loading areas where the warhead is a risk for a catastrophic cascade effect and hence needs to be separrated from the rest of the complex.
Transit tunnel sections, where damage and spall is tolerable and rockbolt and mesh lining applied.
Critical sections and entrance areas with low overburden where high-end lining is applied.

Automatic electrical missile wagon in
transit tunnel section


Beside these details, a total firepower estimate would require to know how many loading areas are present, how many launch wagons as well as how many launch pits.
If it is a large complex as expected, hundreds of different ballistic missiles can be stored, which is done in the most deep sections. Those rockbolt and mesh low-cost lined sections have granite overburdens of 300-600m and are hence considered immune to nuclear attacks.

Liquid fuel missile types that are likely present and compatible with small modification are:
  • 800km range Qiam SRBMs with pin-point strike maneuverable re-entry vehicles (MaRV) as well submunition warheads. Primarily for use against airbases of neighboring counties to destroy specific assets or render operations impossible due to random interval strikes by submunition warheads that require to be cleared fist due to the risk of unexploded ordnance and random location.
  • 1700km range Emad MRBM with pinpont-strike MaRV warhead for regional opponents key military and high value objects.
  • 2000km range Khorramshahr heavy MRBM with submunition and MaRV warhead options. With a payload capability that is around 3-times higher than the Emad and Ghadr-H missile, this new ballistic missile with heavy warhead(s), will become available in higher numbers. In terms of cost-effect, a single Khorramshahr with a 1,8 ton submunition warhead inflicts the same damage as three Ghadr-H, which is a significant advantage.
In terms of firepower generation, depending on how many parallel loading areas are available in the complex to load an unmanned, automated wagon magazine, the value can vary strongly. As site location of this static system is known and the modern missiles employed do not require a turntable for azimuth alignment, loading is done relatively fast.
Compared to Irans tactical solid fuel missiles, the liquid arsenal is launched against predetermined targets, hence if the conflict is of high intensity, missiles will be launched as fast as possible.


Conclusion

In the past Iran achieved nuclear blast hardening with its cavern vertical shaft basing concept for its liquid fuel missile arsenal.

The new 5-missile launch and loading concept can also be applied to that concept, but it is expensive and a very mature missile system with highest reliability is necessary.

Instead it is expected that a sufficient degree of nuclear blast hardening is reached in combination with the open launch pit concept.

It allows existing missile cities to be retrofitted with this capability at a affordable cost and reasonable timescale.
This and the differing lining methods, shows that the IRGC aerospace force is very confident in what is needed to reach a certain objective, at high cost efficiency.

Working area and warhead mating


The dynamics at play for the creation of this basing method are very different to that of other nations:
  • Iran is not a nuclear power; it needs a vast amount of precise firepower to make a difference in a conflict and ultimately deter the opponent from a nuclear counter-force first strike. Here single-missile silos, make no sense for as each theater requires several hundred to up to thousands of ballistic missiles.
  • The lack of nuclear weapons, as well as different basing concepts for it, with the highest capability and most expensive option, SSBNs, allows resources to be concentrated on the conventional missile forces.
  • Iran has the necessary low-populated regions as well as highly mountainous topology and suitable rock formations to allow for such a basing method
The concept brings Iran closer to achieve a capability no other country has: Deter nuclear powers from a preemptive counter-force strike by conventional means. Iran has restricted itself to about 2000km missile range. This range used to be the maximum that could be achieved by a relatively cost efficient single stage missile.

With the technological level of Irans missile program improving quickly, at some point a two stage liquid fueled ICBM to deter the U.S mainland directly may become reality and for such a missile, the missile basing method shown, is likely already sufficiently large in its current state.





Sources for the values on tunnels:

Book: Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons

https://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282/effects-of-nuclear-earth-penetrator-and-other-weapons

https://www.nextbigfuture.com/2016/05/a-hundred-super-ground-penetrator-bombs.htm

Monday, August 24, 2020

Haj Qasem missile: Entering the hypersonic club

Haj Qasem hypersonic missile, 
named after major general Qasem Soleymani

Per definition, many ballistic missile systems could be called hypersonic speed weapons, operating in the mach 5-25 regime.

However the current trend of hypersonic weapons defines something else; operation at hypersonic speeds within the atmospheric layers that allow aerodynamic maneuvering.

Such weapons exploit their kinematic superiority in order to defeat anti-ballistic missile systems. The goal is to force the ABM interceptor to dissipate energy, ultimately an energetic defeat mechanism.

The reason such weapons are developed and now trending so late, is on one side the lower performance of ABM systems in the past and the technological difficulties in terms of thermal-shielding/management.

Haj Qasem launch: entering depressed trajectory


The Haj Qasem missile is basically a ballistic missile that flies a depressed trajectory, cruising at estimated 35-60km altitude. 

The booster stage accelerates a maneuvering re-entry vehicle to mach 12, while its aerodynamic control surfaces remain engaged with the atmosphere. After the carefully controlled cruise phase it impacts at 1400km distance at above mach 5.

This puts the Haj Qasem within the definition of a hypersonic weapon.


Technical features

Haj Qasem represents a new missile platform for Irans tactical solid fuel arsenal. It started with the Fateh-110, which switched to a composite motor casing variant with the Fateh-313.

It continued with the second platform; the Zolfaghar which was then weight optimized to result in the Dezful variant.

Zolfaghar/Dezful on off-road twin launcher
(note triangle vortex generators)

As third platform the Haj Qasem is well in the MRBM range category and offers new growth potential. Compared to the previous platform Zolfaghar, it weights 7000kg instead of 4600kg, has a diamter of ~90cm instead of 67cm but is just ~70cm longer at ~11m.

Like the Zolfaghar, it uses a composite motor casing that is not wound in one piece by carbon-fiber. The fromer is a technology the aerospace industries organization favors for now.

The six months earlier unveiled Raad-500 platform of the IRGC-ASF SSJ organization, itself Fateh-110 derived, has switched to an one piece all carbon fiber filament wound motor casing. A Haj Qasem variant with such a motor casing is an option, to further reduce the structural ratio of the booster stage and so improve its performance.

Raad-500 missile with all-carbon fiber filament motor casing

However even with the technologically inferior AIO composite motor casing technology the calculated structural ratio is at an impressive value of ~0,10 to 0,08, which means 90-92% of the booster weight is fuel and only 8-10% empty-mass.

This value derives from the officially published data on the missile, most importantly its mach 12 burnout velocity. The primary reason for the uncertainties, are the unknown grade of composite solid fuel used and the unknown weight of the maneuvering re-entry vehicle systems. 

Since the booster stage does not have added weight due to a thrust vector control system or a thrust termination system, a low value of 8-10% could be well possible. Iranian designers favored an angled launch method to avoid the use of a TVC system as on the Sejil missile or Salman upper stage. 

The use of a MaRV that corrects any velocity error created by the booster via constant trajectory re-calculation, allowed to skip a thrust termination system as employed on the Sejil-1. Beside weight, all these measures also improve cost efficiency.

U.S Pershing-II missile of the 1980's

The U.S 1980's, then state of the art Pershing II is a good comparison to the Haj Qasem in terms of booster performance. Both accelerate a payload of 600-750kg to a speed of mach 12.

However the Pershing II with its composite aramid motor casing is thicker, heavier and requires two stages to accomplish that goal. This serves as a hint on what level of technology the Haj Qasem employs and the Pershing II is still not regarded as obsolete technology in 2020.

Comparison between Zolfaghar and Haj Qasem MaRV

The high performing booster soon separates from the MaRV, which it puts on a depressed low altitude trajectory. Iranian designers used a modified Zolfaghar/Dezful derived MaRV to reduce costs and risks. This appears to be a reason why the range is restricted to 1400km, since this MaRV platform stemmed from the 700km range Zolfaghar which was later improved to the 1000km range Dezful, designed for significantly lower speeds.

It uses a carbon-carbon composite nosetip, that takes much of the thermal energy which gliding through the atmosphere creates. Four large aerodynamic control surfaces designed for maneuvering in very thin atmospheric layers are also of great importance. Together with the high speed and the ram air pressure velocity creates, it allows the MaRV to maneuver at highest altitudes.

The key to survive the hot journey down to its target, is vast aerothermal scientific knowledge via tests and simulations. An aerothermal management model is necessary, that takes into account the tolerabel speed, maneuvering and altitude at any moment of the flight. Performed in a specific narrow band, the given MaRV or a future hypersonic glide vehicle will reach the target area at the right energy state. Iran explicitly claimed to have mastered such an advanced adaptive flight-dynamic system with the Haj Qasem missile.

With the right amount of maneuvering during the late cruise phase, the Haj Qasem's MaRV would dissipate kinetic energy in the thinner atmospheric layers to sufficiently slow down and finally impact with >mach 5 at 1400km distance. 

This means instead of gaining range due to the strong body lift "wave riding" effect of a HGV, as used in the Chinese DF-17, the Haj Qasem maneuvers to reduce speed, so that it's MaRV can survive the journey.

A positive side effect here is, that the true target trajectory can be masked due to significant course changes, confusing the defending adversary. Most importantly, having mastered the science package of this hypersonic weapon, opens the door to a better MaRV or HGV beyond the Zolfaghar origin MaRV platform.

Comparison of Haj Qasem design with MaRV to DF-17 with HGV

The Chinese DF-17 hypersonic weapon is an advanced and relatively expensive solution equipped with a radar seeker as terminal sensor, indicating an anti-shipping role. Iranian missiles, even long-range ones, achieve hits with pin-point accuracy levels of 10-30m CEP without a terminal sensor.

This raises the question whether a mid-course GPS/GLONASS update of the INS is used, or something exotic such as an astro-navigation system, or simply if new Iranian gyroscopes and accelerometer enable a highly accurate INS. External mid-course updates for the INS in a secure form could also include ground based positioning system on Iranian soil or ground radar position update.

Skipping the terminal sensor, bars the missiles from use against moving targets but also significantly simplifies the MaRV design, foremost thermal shielding.

A problem related to this, are the immense g-loads at re-entry and terminal anti-ABM maneuvering, which can easily destroy sensitive avionic such as the INS. Hence it's possible that a secondary lower accuracy solid-state mechanically robust MEMS based INS, designed to survive the high g-loads is used for the short terminal phase.

Whether it is GPS/GLONASS that allows the Haj Qasem to perform a pin-point strike at 1400km distance or systems that can't be externally influenced at all; the threat it poses is immense, the destructive power devastating. As example a mid-course GLONASS update at 60km altitude and 300km distance to the target area would be almost impossible for the opponent to jam or spoof. 

Its time to arrival is extremely fast due to the shorter depressed trajectory; only shoot-and-scoot level mobile systems could change their position fast enough, certainly not large aperture ABM radars.


Anti-ABM defeat mechanism

The weapon system qualities of the Haj Qasem missile described up to this point, could also be performed by a MaRV'ed ballistic missile for example a MaRV Sejil-2.


Russian Iskander "counter ABM" missile

The Russian Iskander is the most famous SRBM counter to NATO ABM systems. Despite not falling into the hypersonic weapons category, primary because it slows down below mach 5 at impact, it almost does everything hypersonic weapons use for ABM defeat.

A very fast missile, in a superior kinematic state performs pseudo-random maneuvers when reaching predicted ABM system envelope. A constant change of its vector, forces the ABM interceptor to react to those changes, which the interceptor must initially perform in dense atmospheric layers, fighting against gravity. The attacking missile is doing its course changes in thin atmospheric layers and is assisted by gravity on its path down. Each reaction of the interceptor happens with a tiny sensor-, relay- and actuator- delay which has significant adverse impact at those high speeds.

The kinetic energy reserve a > mach 6 SRBM like the Iskander can tap into for such maneuvering is very limited compared to the mach 12 Haj Qasem.

Western fighter pilot know the energy defeat mechanism as the F-pole maneuver, primary used to defeat BVR AAMs by changing the the fighters vector and forcing the AAM to bleed its energy when updating its course. The same situation occurs if an ABM interceptor engages a MaRV or a Iskander-like missile.

Israeli Arrow-2 endo-atmospheric ABM interceptor

The other method to exploit western ABM interceptors weaknesses is by operating in regimes for which they were not designed. Often because they were made to counter common non-maneuvering ballistic missile RV's.

ABM interceptors such as SM-3, THAAD and Arrow-3 are restricted by altitude, they can't operate below a certain altitude threshold due to air friction. These exo-atmospheric interceptors have little effective usage against hypersonic or Iskander type missiles. 

Of these three only THAAD has a aerodynamically formed nose seeker that can take dynamic pressure and thermal loads to a certain extend. To what altitude and at which speeds this is possible is unclear. However even with the seeker not being a limiting factor e.g via late jettisoned protection shroud: THAAD is a TVC steered system and its kill-vehicle's altitude control thrusters offer only very limited course correction reserves. Hence against Haj Qasem it can counter react to course changes as long as its booster is active, but afterwards its lack of aerodynamic control surfaces degrade its course correction capacity, as large vector changes will deplete its KV fuel reserves.


The second category; the endo-atmospheric interceptors, are represented by e.g Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3, Arrow-1/2, SM-2/6, S-300/-400 and David Sling. Its these interceptors against which the energy defeat maneuvering is used. Goal of the interceptor is to be at one point in time close enough to the attacking missile and additionally fast and maneuverable enough, for an endgame high-g turn and finally hit, or trigger its HE-frag warhead.

The more energy the interceptor is forced to dissipate by counter/reaction maneuvering, the smaller its engagement envelope becomes. The area it is able to protect becomes smaller, to a point, at which it will never reach the attacking missiles rendezvous position at all.

In the case of the mach 12 Haj Qasem missile, energy must be dissipated in order to slow it down to below mach 6 at impact. Hence the kinetic energy equivalent of 6 mach numbers is available to its MaRV for late cruise phase and terminal phase maneuvering. The dissipated energy will heat up the MaRV and cause the desired positional changes. 

Relatively low g maneuvers that change the heading angle by few degrees will, at those high speeds, create large difference in distance of missile to interceptor. The more energy reserve/speed is available, the more such heading angle change cycles can be performed, to which the interceptor must react, since it doesn't know what the intended target is.

As the maneuvers become more intense the closer the missile comes to its target, it suddenly goes vertical with highest intensity maneuvering to hit the intended object from above. This vertical dive maneuver increases the unpredictability and makes interception more difficult. 

The Iskander can only perform late and relatively few maneuvering cycles during its vertical dive, primary intended to defeat PAC-3 and David Sling type terminal ABM interceptors. Haj Qasem starts earlier, with more cycles, of more severe vector variations. 

This improves its performance against high kinematic capability, area-defense interceptors like the Arrow-2 and further reduces engagement envelopes to points where the ABM system itself can be attacked.

Simplified graphic of hypersonic weapon trajectory

To degrade ABM sensor performance and the early warning system, it must be understood that hypersonic missiles can be seen as high flying cruise missiles. While space based IR sensors can pick up the boost phase of the Haj Qasem at launch and initial trajectory, its high energy level can be used to drastically alter its trajectory after boost phase.

This, combined with the small MaRV of low RCS, especially compared to the whole Iskander missile body, creates a target that is difficult to discover and track. Pseudo-random maneuvering means that the final destination of the MaRV can't be predicted either.

This creates a set of problems, where warning is late and not specific.

One of the few benefits of ABM systems against hypersonic weapons, is the denied usage of decoys and effective "traveling" chaff clouds.


Basing options: Missile farms

The preceding platform, namely the Zolfaghar missile was used on transporter erector launchers which had a single or two missiles each. There is a high possibility that we will see such twin launchers for the Haj Qasem missile in future as well.

Irans missile farm underground basing option

The most intriguing basing method however, was unveiled by the IRGC-ASF in summer 2020; the so called "missile farm" basing method.

A canister with a missile is buried up to meters deep in earth. Once launched, the hot gases exiting the top of the canister throwing away covering earth, and the missile exits the canister. A deeper, open shaft where the missile travels through was also claimed to be possible.

Compared to Irans "missile cities" tunneled into hard mountain rock, this concept is not a hardened basing method. But ambiguity via the potential for decoy launch sites creates a relative soft but survivable basing concept.

Without resorting to a nuclear counter-force strike to neutralize the buried missiles, the concepts requires a very low CEP weapon to hit the launch site, to destroy it. Flat featureless terrain is selected for the launch sites, tens to hundreds meters away from each other. This creates serious problems to achieve a <5m CEP hit in an environment where GPS signal is likely degraded by jamming, as optical/IIR terrain matching is difficult.

As conventional blast over-pressure doesn't work against against a missile buried in flat terrain, a very direct hit by a heavy weapon is needed to neutralize the missile. Decoy sites can't be identified by any physical air or space based principle known, leaving HUMINT as only mean to identify where real missiles are buried.

Suspected container launcher used for buried missiles

Another aspect of this novel basing concept innovated by Iran is, that the missiles are ready to fire. In a realistic scenario the bulk of the missiles buried would have been launched instantly before an campaign to neutralize the missile farms could start.

Multiple simultaneous launches against pre-programmed targets at the start of hostilities, saturating ABM systems, is the realistic scenario this basing concept enables.

In terms of logistics it offers the benefit, that dangerously explosive solid fuel missiles are not stored in tunnel systems or specifically built bunkers, where an incident or inflicted damage could cause a catastrophic cascade effect. The effort for a safe storage container and a bunker or even tunnel is instead invested in a launch container that is simply buried in a vast secured area.

The fixed basing also offers the benefit of an accurately known initial position, which increases accuracy if an all-INS guidance is employed.

Composite image of pin-point hit by burning Haj Qasem MaRV

Tactically most attractive of all features, is the on-demand availability for launch. A target detected by any means can be instantly attacked without preparation time. 

The IRGC-ASF first military satellite, the Noor that is apparently working in the infrared band, is a hint of future capabilities for target detection. A constellation of such expandable IR or SAR satellites, detecting a target and able to communicate the targets position fast enough, would enable an instant attack. The chain of action from detection, to data transmission, to analysis and launch order would greatly benefit from a weapon instantly ready to fire and with a very short time to arrival.

The mobile, compact Qased SLV gives a hint that Iran is interested to acquire an expandable cubesat-size and inexpensive satellite constellation capability. In a conflict that would degrade such a constellation by the opponents ASAT capabilities, on-demand wartime launches of replacement satellites, randomly launched by compact mobile SLVs, would be the primary mean to find targets for the long range missile forces.

IR signature of U.S base in Qatar taken by IRGC-ASF Noor satellite

The attractive features of this new basing concept, required technological breakthroughs for Iran. First and foremost advances in missile internal energy supply, all-electric servo actuators and advances in the guidance systems that need to orient the missile in 3D space.

Pneumatic actuators of previous generation systems are replaced by storable all electric ones. These in turn need batteries that retain their power for years, batteries that need to provide sufficient energy for the intensive maneuvering, hypersonic weapons perform. Common 2D-plane guidance algorithms that required the missile in the right rotation angle are not applicable anymore. The missile must survive hot gas environment that is employed to throw away the protecting top earth layer.

The Haj Qasem's compact 8 rear stabilizer fin configuration is clearly because it is meant to be used in this buried container hot launch basing mode. For ease of the manufacturing process, the stabilizer configuration of previous generations with a vortex generator assisting the stabilizer is omitted in the Haj Qasem. While still possible to be applied in the Zolfaghar and Dezful composite motor casings, the vortex generator won't be applicable anymore in a future Raad-500-like all carbon-fiber filament motor casing.


Conclusion

The Haj Qasem can be described by two features: First, it is a new high performance booster platform made to stay within Irans 2000km self-proclaimed range restriction. Second, it is a demonstration of the scientific package needed for hypersonic weapons, foremost in the aerothermal field.

A third point that will certainly result in a more potent variant in the future, is thermal resistent materials and their economic application in the manufacturing process. It will result in a DF-17 like weapon, although the Haj Qasem booster is apparently already better performing than that used on the DF-17.

A lifting body HGV will exploit range benefits, which results in a 7-8 ton, single stage missile with a significant weight conventional high-energy explosive warhead to have a range of ~2000km. That range is a threshold from which tactical airpower can't be effectively employed anymore, leaving strategic airpower as option left in this category.

The missile farm concepts allows ready to launch missile to be stored for years or even more than a decade in relatively protected buried containers. Therefore survivability of the Haj Qasem arsenal can be regarded as very high. Relatively small 8x8 off-road TELs with two missiles each of MRBM range capability is another feature of this kind of next generation weapon.

Although it could be described as nearly immune to any current deployed ABM system in the western world, a better thermally shielded HGV variant would reinforce its capabilities in this field, due to its ability to fly at an even lower altitude band of between 40-50km.

Haj Qasem represents a new kind of menace and while in the past, e.g Israel, had a countering system ready or near completion against new Iranian long range missile types, this is the first time there is not even a system announced to be in development to counter it.

Thursday, July 2, 2020

3rd Khordad: The RQ-4 downing


Understanding what was achieved

This post is about the Iranian 3rd Khordad SAM, a system that should not have been able to do it's first operational kill of a RQ-4 in summer 2019.



A RQ-4 Global Hawk is an expensive and vital asset in U.S airpower structure, that does the battlefield management of a whole front section.
It remains far behind the lines, employing its stand-off SAR/GMTI sensors and has no crew that is put to risk.

The first iteration of such a capability was to be protected by employing a survivable air platform, which resulted in the low-observable/stealth (LO) Tacit Blue design.
Technical hurdles forced the U.S to abandon this plan and the solution was the E-8 Joint STARS.
A large E-3 AWACS-like concept, where larger sensor size allowed for increased distance to the dangerous battlefield periphery.

It added up to the portfolio of U.S airpower force-multiplier support assets; systems that greatly enhance the U.S airpower concept, but are vulnerable.
Too vulnerable in confrontations with peer-level adversaries, yet still sufficient against opponents lacking "strategic assets".



The RQ-4 hence became what the Tacit Blue should have been; JSTARS capability within a survivable platform. 
The aerodynamic penalty the Tacit Blue had to pay, due to its LO geometry with its heavy emphasis of deflecting radar waves could be reduced.
Instead the requirement for LO/stealth aspect of the design was achieved by material stealth.

Aerodynamic LO penalties were reduced so much that the RQ-4 became a kinematically high performance platform with vast endurance and high altitude performance.

Credits to members of military.ir
Credits to members of military.ir

Its radar absorbing materials and structures (RAM/RAS) are very expensive to manufacture and designed to disrupt a key element of the kill chain, of a system trying to kill it: The engagement phase, where normally X-band and higher radar wavelength are employed.
The X-band allows a small aperture seeker in the SAM and/or a sufficiently high precision ground/air tracking by the radar system.

The RAS of the RQ-4 BAMS-D that was shot down, is a complex double layer honeycomb design in critical areas. Its size suggest that its design perform best in the critical 8 Ghz X-band at which almost all SAM systems operate, including the 3rd Khordad.

Quantifying the LO performance of the RQ-4

The performance depends on the radar cross section of the geometry, overall size, to which an average RAS/RAM performance is added. It is best measured in dB.

Credits to members of military.ir

This is a crude simulation but gives a general idea what the RCS of a blank RQ-4 at 8-10 Ghz looks like.
It averages 0-5 dB at relevant aspects and would be higher if the emitter/radar is ground based, like in this case.

Another more professional analysis is available for the RAS, the key LO performance element of the RQ-4 design.

Credits to members of military.ir

The highest reduction in X-band is between -25 to -20 dB. 
That's if a RQ-4 that applies similar double layer RAS all around the air frame. In practice this is not the case and here we must average the variations of geometric RCS and its RAS/RAM coverage.

Ideal results are between -25 dB and -15 dB overall RCS of relevant aspects.
A stable RCS for tracking is therefore estimated to be -10 dB to -20 dB, which gives an idea of the grade of low observability of the RQ-4.
To be on the conservative side, a RCS of -20 dB or 0,01m² is selected for all frontal threat aspects and against a ground based  X-band emitter.

As the performance parameters of the 3rd Khordad have not been published, we can calculate the performance of other better known systems against a -20 dB class target.
The highest performance system, of which the necessary data for the radar equation is known, is the export variant of the Russian S-400:
  • Tracking of a -20 dB class target by the 92N6E X-band engagement radar would be 56km.
  • Tracking of a -10 dB class target by the 92N6E X-band engagement radar would be 100km.
Iran claims that target was tracked or locked at 120km, missile was launched at 90km distance and hit the approaching RQ-4 at 75km distance.

The 3rd Khordad however is not comparable to the S-400. In terms of aperture size, its about 7 times smaller and doesn't achieve as high power levels.


How was it done?

The inadequacy of the 3rd Khordad engagement radar and the comparatively high LO performance of the large conventional layout RQ-4 rise questions.
The AESA technology which the 3rd Khordad employs, compared to the PESA S-400, is no explanation either, as it could never make up for the performance level necessary.

Beyond the world of conventional techniques, and modes described in export rated system manuals, there are some interesting points.

A SARH seeker based SAM system with an IMU can fly an energy optimized pattern, where it climbs above the target and dives into it.

3rd Khordad Taer-2 missile diving into target

This offers improved kinematic performance than a SAM doing just proportional navigation.
It also allows lock-on after launch in order to control emissions and remain passive.

Additional to all of that, it puts the ground based emitter and the approaching SAM's seeker into bi-static positions relative to each other.
This can offer improvements against systems that employ techniques of shape/geometry LO/stealth, which deflect radar waves away from the emitter line of sight.

The RQ-4 is not a sophisticated representative of shape LO and concentrates on high performance radar absorption as a subsonic design.

Simplistic graphic on bi-static effect of SARH SAM

Another reality of such next generation systems are their inherent data fusion and multi-band architecture.
Here the 3rd Khordad's own AESA radar would do textbook tracking engagements against non-LO/stealth conventional targets. 
Against LO/VLO targets, its main task would become that of high-power missile up-link, missile tracker and terminal illuminator.

The long range tracking in such cases could be done by other radar systems that perform better against X-band optimized LO assets.
Lower band radars in VHF-band nearly completely neutralize the benefits of RAM and RAS and to a lesser extend also help against LO shaping techniques.
However they often fail to provide accurate coordinates for the SAM to get sufficiently close to the target to kill it.

At some point sooner or later, a portion of the illuminated engagement radar frequency energy would get picked up by the SAM's SARH seeker, even if a large portion is absorbed or deflected by the LO target.

In this case the 3rd Khordad would do a blind illumination based on the coordinate data of the lower band radar that tracks the LO target. A key requirement for such a operation mode, would be knowledge on the accurate positions of both radars relative to each other.

Najm-802B S-band AESA radar

Illuminating a spot in airspace, blindly requires a sufficiently high accuracy. Irans family of S-band AESA's offer such accuracy levels at relative long ranges.
This could be sufficient to allow the 3rd Khordad's X-band radar, to illuminate the LO target without own tracking.

The 3-3,5 Ghz operating frequency of these radars reduces the -20-25 dB performance of the double layer honeycomb RAS, effectively down to around -7 dB. 
The result is that the lower-band of this S-band AESA, allows it to confront the RQ-4 as a -7 dB (0,2m²) class LO asset, not -20 dB as in X-band.

Simulated models of the Najm-802B with conservative, very low power TRMs show that it would offer sufficient capability to do a 80-100km tracking of a -5-7 dB class LO target.

Thermal imaging camera of the 3rd Khordad

Thermal imaging systems able to detect air targets at extended ranges are a quite recent development. The performance class needed to detect a air targets at 70-100km distance was only in the hands of few advanced nations in the 2000's. 
Today Iran employs such high performance TI optics on its tactical 3rd Khordad SAM system.
They allow angle tracking of targets that either can't be radar tracked due to electronic warfare, or by employing LO/stealth techniques like in the case of the RQ-4.
The TI system could either help to compensate radar positional errors of the multi-band engagement solution as mentioned above, or assist in autonomous engagements.

In the latter scenario, a low-band radar would do the coarse tracking, such as the widespread Matla-ol-Fajr-2.

Matla-ol-Fajr-2 VHF-band array

The low coordinate accuracy would then be compensated by angular tracking via the TI camera system.
This combined employment of multi-band radar data and corrections from the TI sensor, could then be sufficient for the blind illumination concept via the 3rd Khordad own X-band radar.

Active radar homing SAM could be another explanation. 
Cost and robustness are main reasons why Iran stays with the SARH principle, just like Russia.
Russia's newest SAM system, the S-350 employs ARH SAM to counter terrain masking cruise missile, that are not protected by electronic warfare.
In such scenarios, loss of LOS illumination is no issue anymore because the SAM is illuminating its own target from above. 
Ambush scenarios are other cases where ARH may be employed, such as long-range shots by the S-400 40N6 missile against physically large U.S airpower support assets.

However the reason even the newest S-350 retains the expensive X-band PESA engagement radar, is that under severe electronic warfare conditions, the dual-mode SAM seeker can switch to SARH/SAGG mode, which is the most robust mode.

Iran claims that there is a 105km range variant of the Taer SAM for the 3rd Khordad. This maybe a special variant, that uses ARH seeker at ranges where the 3rd Khordad's own engagement radar can't effectively illuminate. However, this could also be the maximum range of the newest Taer-2 variant against kinematically low performance targets. 
Irans view on ARH tactical SAM seems to be that they are too fragile on one side and too expensive, if to be made robust, on the other.
After the shot down of an Ukrainian airliner by an Iranian Tor-M1, Iran acknowledged that U.S electronic warfare assets are taken very seriously.

The concept of an imaging infrared seeker SAM variant sounds attractive, just like the ARH concept initially. However here its not the cost for the seeker but the robustness and redundancy factors. Beside an aerodynamic penalty for a IIR seeker on SAM kinematics, SARH or even SAGG is simply regarded as very mature and robust. An IIR seeker SAM could probably simply not come out as the winner in a competition with a SARH counterpart on the key parameters.

3rd Khordad TELAR transiting

There are more techniques that could be applied to allow for an extended-range engagement of LO targets in the class of the RQ-4, but it would be too theoretical at this point.


What happend most likely on that night

The RQ-4 BAMS-D started from an airbase the UAE and climbed to altitude. During that climb it should have appeared at some point on the screens of the Iranian Ghadir/Rezonans long range early warning radar. With its strict emission control, no active IFF, and flight pattern Iranians would realize at some point that it is a Global Hawk leaving UAE airspace towards Iran.

Later a manned P-8 maritime surveillance aircraft added up and they formed a group, typical for a long range reconnaissance mission along Iranian borders. A slower MQ-9 drone added to the group on their way back towards the straight of Hormuz.
Once near Iranian borders, the old, static early warning radar network and mobile VHF Matla-ol-Fajr-2 early warning radars would have detected and tracked the LO/stealth RQ-4.

When warnings were ignored and Irans airspace violated, the decision was made to engage the RQ-4.

At the remote missile site where the 3rd Khordad system was, likely also a widespreadly used Matla-ol-Fajr-2 was present, directly linked to the 3rd Khordad.
The 3rd Khordad remained passive, as illumination of the RQ-4 could trigger its powerful towed electronic warfare system.
Coarse coordinated were continuously provided to the 3rd Khordad which allowed angle tracking by its TI camera. Coarse range data came via the Matla-ol-Fajr-2 and this was sufficient to launch a Taer-2 towards the estimated interception point.
The Taer-2 would then have received mid-course updates via the short range data-link of the 3rd Khordad. 

3rd Khordad operators

Approaching the target the 3rd Khordad would have started emissions of its LPI AESA radar to track the SAM and do the later stage, long range, course updates. 
This was not perceived as a threat by the ESM suite of the RQ-4. 
Continuous command guidance would not be necessary as the IMU of the Taer-2 can work with one update every several seconds without wasting too much kinetic energy.

It appears that, if at all, only the missile approach warning system detected the inbound Taer-2 and this was to late to deploy the towed jammer, since the Iranian operators claim that there was no ECM as they had expected.
Seconds away from impact the 3rd Khordad radar would have started blind illumination of the target based on the external VHF-radar data, corrected by the angular data from its own TI camera. This would then have been precise enough to concentrate the electronically steered, illumination pencil beam on the RQ-4.
The now very close distance Taer-2 SARH seeker would then have picked up the portion of RF energy that had not been absorbed by RAS or deflected by shape.

Once locked it would have corrected the trajectory uncertainties caused by the VHF and TI sensors, got the exact range to the target and brought itself into a parallel position for the highest directed fragmentation effect of its warhead.
In the last phase redundant seeker and proximity fuses would determine the right timing and direction for the detonation of the warhead.

Taer-2 approaching a low RCS target drone

Conclusion

Iranians claim that Russians called the 3rd Khordad's missile "mythical" after information was exchanged. 
The reason should be the fact, that as per conventional engagement techniques, even large brute-force SAM systems such as the S-400 can't track the RQ-4 at extended ranges with their engagement radar alone. Certainly Russians apply similar unconventional techniques for engagement of LO assets, at least in their domestic federation standard systems.

3rd Khordad would not have been able to track a RQ-4 class LO target at beyond 25-30km, but was able to engage at 90km and kill at 75km.
Its a display of what is possible if you are the owner and creator of the system design, it can be continuously updated and integrated with other systems.
It must also be understood that the RQ-4 is a genuine LO/stealth asset which capabilities in this field should not be downplayed after the shot down. Its AESA radar is said to have high LPI capabilities and its emissions very difficult for ESM systems to pick-up and finding the source of it.

The same defeat tactics could be employed against more capable LO/stealth assets such as F-22 and F-35, even if their LO performance is higher than that of Global Hawk.

The 3rd Khordad is the final result of IRGC-ASF's quest for a:
  • cost-efficient (low cost SAM, low cost TEL, low cost radar, COTS components)
  • highly mobile and off-road capable
  • highly autonomous (target search/acquisition and engagement done by single radar on TEL) 
  • low footprint (small size and easily disguised)
  • shoot and scoot (fast change of position)
  • multi-target engagement capable
  • low maintenance and support footprint
SAM system which roots go back to the SA-6, which was highly regarded by the IRGC.
It creates a sphere of 150km diameter under protection against tactical fighters and 210km against kinematically low performance assets such as U.S air power support platforms.
It can suddenly appear near a contested front sector or areas where the SEAD/DEAD mission is seen as accomplished.
It can also operate within a battery of other 3rd Khordad TELAR and TELs if such structures are intact.
Its high performance TI camera allows to avoid decoys and only engage targets that are worth it.
The load of just 3 Taer-2 may appear low but the missile is regarded as highly sophisticated, indicated by the single shot against the RQ-4.

Overall it's asymmetric approaches which the 3rd Khordad employs to be successful against an air power machinery, as that of the U.S.
It's the flexible backbone of IRGC-ASF's air defense, designed to remain a threat down to the last phase of any potential conflict.